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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION 
 
HOW DOES THE NATURE OF ACCOUNTING STANDARDS AFFECT 
AUDIT QUALITY AND EARNINGS ATTRIBUTES? 
by 
 
Ran Ling 
 
Florida International University, 2018  
Miami, Florida 
Professor Steve Wen-Jen Lin, Major Professor 
 
The purpose of this study is to provide evidence on the effects of the nature of accounting 
standards (i.e. principles- versus rules-based accounting standards) on audit quality and 
earnings attributes. I construct a comprehensive instrument to effectively measure rules-
based characteristics in the U.S. GAAP following Mergenthaler (2011). I then construct a 
firm-level instrument to capture firms' reliance on principles-based accounting standards 
using the textual analysis approach developed by Folsom et al. (2017). Using data from 
S&P 500 companies during 2009-2014, I first examine whether principles- (or rules-) based 
standards in the FASB Accounting Standards Codification (ASC) system affect both the 
inputs (i.e. audit fees) and the outcomes (i.e. financial misstatements) of the audit process. 
The multivariate regression results show that firms applying more principles-based 
standards pay less audit fees but the nature of accounting standards doesn’t affect 
restatements. My finding suggests that auditors do consider the degree of precision and 
complexity in accounting standards when assessing the level of audit inputs, but audit 
quality is generally not compromised by the nature of accounting standards. I also 
investigate the influence on firms’ earnings attributes. More specifically, I examine the 
statistical association between firms’ reliance on principles- (or rules-) based accounting 
vii  
standards and the timely loss recognition (TLR) during the same sample period. 
Interestingly, I find that the timeliness in loss recognition is insensitive to firms’ choice of 
applying more principles- (or rules-) based accounting standards. The results of this study 
should be of interest to preparers, auditors, U.S. standards setters, and accounting 
researchers.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 In this study, I examine how the nature of U.S. accounting standards affects audit 
quality and earnings attributes. The nature of accounting standards can be best 
characterized as a spectrum ranging from conceptual principles-based to detailed rules-
based (SEC 2003; Cunningham 2007). To distinguish between the two extremes in 
accounting standards, people consider accounting treatments under principles-based 
standards aiming to capture the underlying economic substance of transactions whereas 
those under rules-based standards emphasizing more on the degree of precision or the 
complexity (e.g., Kaplow 2000; Schipper 2003; Maines et al 2003). However, in practice, 
a "standard" is usually a combination of both principles and rules that apply to a certain 
accounting issue.1  
 U.S. accounting standards are widely recognized as being constructed upon a set of 
principles derived from the FASB’s Conceptual Framework. However, due to the existence 
of a strong legal regime (e.g. high litigation risk) and the presence of complexity in 
accounting issues (e.g. fair value measurement), various “rules-based” elements such as 
scope exceptions and detailed implementation guidance lead the U.S. GAAP to become 
rules-oriented (Schipper 2003). Even though U.S. GAAP is considered as a high-quality 
accounting system given the political, institutional, and cultural factors (La Porta et al. 
1998, Ball et al. 2000, Ball et al 2003, Leuz et al. 2003), concerns arise that U.S. accounting 
standards have become heavily skewed towards the rules-based end of the spectrum 
(Schipper 2003, FASB 2002, and Nobes 2004), and even more rules-based over time 
(Mergenthaler 2011). In response to the difficulties facing U.S. financial reporting 
                                                          
1 As the SEC classified, U.S. GAAP and IFRS contain both principles- and rules- based standards although 
it is widely believed that U.S. GAAP are more rules based than IFRS.  
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environment since the corporate accounting scandals in early 2000s, U.S. standard setters 
initiated a shift to a more “principles-based” financial reporting system and proposed a 
possible adoption of IFRS which are commonly perceived in the accounting literature to 
be more principles-based standards (the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 2002). Although the SEC 
staff report in 2012 noted several irreconcilable fundamental differences between U.S. 
GAAP and IFRS and implicitly expressed the SEC's decision not to adopt IFRS, the debate 
over the cost-benefit economic analysis of the implementation of a principles-based system 
has continued.  
 On the one hand, principles-guided standards focus on the nature and purposes of 
firms’ economic transactions and provide general guidance on how to fairly account for 
and report these transactions in financial statements. Hence, they require preparers (i.e. 
managers) to exercise high-level professional judgment and expertise and allow preparers 
to accommodate the specifics of an economic transaction (Maines et al. 2003, Nobes 2004). 
However, principles-based accounting system per se may not guarantee higher accounting 
quality for some reasons. First of all, it leaves room for different preparers’ interpretations, 
resulting in potential lack of comparability between financial reports. Secondly, principles-
based standards may tolerate too much discretion where managers could exercise their 
judgment opportunistically to manipulate earnings or hide information to achieve desired 
outcomes such as maximizing compensation, circumventing debt covenant violations, and 
avoiding stock price declines (e.g. Healy and Wahlen 1999, Dechow and Skinner 2000). 
Moreover, it is also costly for auditors and enforcement agencies to understand and decide 
whether firm-specific interpretations are presented correctly (e.g. Herz 2003). 
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 On the other hand, U.S. GAAP contains specific criteria, “bright-line” thresholds, 
examples, scope exceptions, subsequent precedents, and implementation guidance (FASB 
2002; Nelson 2003; Schipper 2003; SEC 2003). These characteristics increase the precision 
and complexity of an accounting standard extensively. Features such as bright lines and 
high-level details provide greater specificity and clarity on accounting for particular 
transactions. Therefore, rules-based standards increase communication accuracy and 
eliminate managerial opportunistic activities that lead to aggressive reporting choices 
(Nelson 2003). Opponents, on the contrary, argue that rules-based characteristics often 
provide safe harbors to managers because detailed guidance and alternatives make it harder 
to differentiate between an innocent misapplication of GAAP and an intentional violation. 
That’s why managers are more likely to attempt earnings management through transaction 
structuring under rules-based standards (Nelson et al. 2002). Secondly, since rules-based 
characteristics demand less use of professional judgment, critics concern that auditors 
could just follow “check the box” mentality as long as the rules fall within their literal 
scope regardless of their intent and purpose. Lastly, the emphasis on detailed guidance not 
only delays timely reporting but is also deemed as a form of insurance against lawsuits, 
where compliance with rules is perceived to provide a defense against allegations of 
negligence or fraud (Maines et al 2003; Melone 2004). 
 Prior research in economics and accounting has provided evidence, especially on 
managers’ incentives for earnings management, that varying levels of rules-based 
characteristics affect individuals’ behavior differently over the degree to which people 
consider themselves to be punished from violating a rule (Kaplow 2000, Nelson et al. 
2002). For example, a survey study conducted by Nelson et al. (2002) indicates that 
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managers align their earnings management strategies with corresponding accounting 
standards (whether the standards are principles- or rules- based) to minimize auditors’ 
inquiry and public scrutiny while the auditor’s incentives also vary with the applicable 
standards. However, little empirical evidence is available in the literature on whether 
decision makers alter their behavior depending on the precision and complexity of relevant 
accounting standards. One reason is the lack of appropriate approach to capture principles- 
vs. rules-based characteristics in accounting standards. The existing studies are mostly 
operationalized in experimental setting where rules-based features are manipulated by 
whether the standard contains “bright-line” thresholds in the case of lease classification 
(Agoglia et al. 2011, Collins et al 2012). 
 To identify principles- (or rules-) based characteristics in U.S. GAAP, I employ the 
rules-based continuum (RBC) measure following Mergenthaler (2011). RBC scores 
effectively capture rules-oriented features contained in each U.S. accounting standard. But 
not every standard is necessarily applicable to each firm. Companies adopt appropriate 
standards depending on the nature of the businesses and various transactions involved. 
Thus, to capture firms’ reliance on principles- (or rules-) based standards, I construct a 
firm-level instrument, PSCORE, using the textual analysis approach developed by Folsom 
et al. (2017).  Practically, I compile a keyword list for each FASB Accounting Standards 
Codification (ASC) topic and then count the number of times these keywords appear in 
companies’ 10-K filings.2 PSCORE is the result from mapping the RBC scores to keyword 
counts in firms’ annual reports. This process determines what pertinent standards each firm 
is complying with and reveals the influence of the standards. Also, this study constructs 
                                                          
2 I also consider standard amendments in the Accounting Standards Update (ASU) every year during the 
sample period. 
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PSCORE in the way that a higher PSCORE indicates more use of principles-based 
standards in a firm’s financial statements. 
 This study uses audit fee and financial restatement as proxies for audit quality while 
earnings quality is measured by the timely recognition of economic losses. These variables 
are widely used in the literature to investigate audit and earnings quality, respectively. 
Using S&P 500 firms during the sample period between 2009-2014, my results show that 
the average PSCORE of my sample firms dropped after 2009, indicating firms were 
complying with less principles-based standards. Later, it holds relatively stable from 2011 
to 2013 with a slightly increase in 2014. Such increase in PSCORE suggests that firms are 
actually applying more principles-based standards despite the fact that standards are 
becoming more rules-oriented. In the analysis of the PSCORE among Big 4 audit firms, I 
also find that companies audited by KPMG or Ernst & Young rely more on the principles-
based standards, and more importantly, they pay less audit fees, while Deloitte and 
PricewaterhouseCoopers tend to have their clients applying more rules-based standards and 
charge higher audit fees.3 
 I first examine whether principles- (or rules-) based standards in the U.S. GAAP 
affect both inputs (i.e. audit fees) and outcomes (i.e. financial misstatements) of the audit 
process.4 The multivariate regression results show that PSCORE is negatively associated 
with the audit fees but not related to restatements, suggesting that auditors do consider the 
degree of precision and complexity in accounting standards when assessing the level of 
                                                          
3 This study does not examine whether auditors are principles- (or rules-) based. Future research may 
investigate the dynamics between principles- and rules- based standards and auditors.  
4 Audit input includes auditors’ evaluation of audit risk and auditors’ effort to audit clients’ financial 
statements. In other words, audit input is more about audit fee. In contrast, audit outcome is more about 
audit quality. This study uses financial statement restatement as a proxy for audit quality.  
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audit inputs, but the nature of accounting standards doesn’t appear to have affected the 
outcome of audit process. Principles-based standards focus on the economic substance 
instead of legal form of transactions and involve significant professional judgment and 
greater expertise. Hence, these standards should lead to higher accounting quality (Folsom 
et al. 2017), which in turn has a lower audit risk. However, principles-based standards 
heavily rely on managerial discretion, which may be used by managers for opportunistic 
activities, and increase audit risk. Moreover, Donelson et al (2012) documents that 
financial statement restatements associated with principles-based standards are more likely 
to involve accounting litigation. In other words, firms that use more principles-based 
standards have higher audit risk in general.  Auditors therefore have to trade off the cost 
and benefit of principles- based standards and evaluate their potential net effects on audit 
risk. My finding supports the notion that auditors perceive firms that use more principles-
based standards to have lower audit risk compared to firms that use more rules-based 
standards. As a result, auditors charge less audit fees to firms that use more principles-
based standards. To my best knowledge, this finding is new in the literature. 
 Financial statement restatements have been widely used as a proxy for poor audit 
quality. It is not clear in the literature as to whether principles- (or rules-) based standards 
are more likely to trigger financial statement restatements. On the one hand, principles-
based standards significantly rely on managerial professional judgement and expertise, 
managerial discretion plays an important role in determining accounting quality, which in 
turn affects audit quality. Hence, principles-based standards may trigger more restatements 
if managers abuse their judgement or discretion. On the other hand, principles-based 
standards allow managers to reflect the economic substance of transactions, which should 
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increase accounting quality and reduce audit risk. Hence, these standards may reduce 
financial statement restatements. My finding suggests that although auditors perceive firms 
using more principles-based standards to have lower audit risk and charge less audit fees 
compared to firms using more rules-based standards, audit quality is generally not 
compromised by the nature of accounting standards. This finding is also new to the 
literature.   
I also investigate the influence of principles- vs. rules-based accounting standards 
on firms’ earnings attributes. More specifically, I examine the statistical association 
between firm-level PSCORE and the timeliness in loss recognition during the same sample 
period. Timely recognition of economic losses has been widely used in the literature as a 
proxy for accounting quality. More (less) timely recognition of economic losses is regarded 
as a proxy for high (low) quality earnings. Folsom et al. (2017) find that principles-based 
accounting standards are associated with higher accounting quality, measured by value 
relevance, frequency of meeting and beating analysts’ forecasts, small positive earnings, 
and discretionary accruals. However, they do not investigate whether PSCORE is also 
associated with the timeliness in loss recognition. I investigate this issue to fill the gap in 
the literature. I predict that principles-based standards should improve timely loss 
recognition because these standards emphasize on economic substance instead of legal 
form of transactions. Interestingly, I find that PSCORE doesn’t impact on timeliness in loss 
recognition, indicating that timeliness in loss recognition is insensitive to firms’ choice of 
applying more principles- (or rules-) based accounting standards.  
 The remainder of the proposal proceeds as follows: Section 2 summarizes related 
literature in accounting standards and Characteristics in U.S. GAAP. Section 3 develops 
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hypotheses on the nature of U.S. accounting standards on audit quality and earnings 
attributes. Section 4 describes research design and data selection. Section 5 depicts 
descriptive statistics and provides empirical evidence. The final section concludes and 
discusses contributions and limitations. 
 
II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
II.1 Nature of Accounting Standards 
 Accounting standards are viewed as the regulatory devices of accounting. They are 
essential to the efficient functioning of the economy, where decisions about the allocation 
of resources by investors, creditors, and other users rely heavily on financial information 
that must be relevant, reliable, comparable, and consistent (Concept Statements, FASB, 
1978). It is commonly considered that financial accounting standards lie on a spectrum 
between conceptual principles and detailed rules. Many studies argue that principles-
guided standards capture the economic substance of transactions whereas rules-based 
standards emphasize more on the degree of precision or the complexity they embody (e.g., 
Kaplow 2000; Schipper 2003; Maines et al 2003). Therefore, a "standard" alone is a 
combination of principles and rules that apply to a certain accounting issue. 5 
 The debate over the merits of principles-based versus rules-based standards has 
continued and is well documented in the literature. For instance, Maines et al (2003) argue 
that principles based standards are like two sides of a sword. On the one hand, they help 
                                                          
5 Prior studies document that both IFRS and U.S. GAAP contain principles and rules based standards. For 
example, Donelson et al (2016) show that under IFRS both accounting for “Consolidation” (IAS 27) and 
“Leases” (IAS 17) are more principle-based standards while both lie towards the rules-based end under U.S. 
GAAP (ARB51 and SFAS 13, respectively). Nevertheless, IFRS identifies accounting for “Inventory” (IAS 
2), “Interest capitalization” (IAS 23), “Asset retirement obligation” (IAS 37), and “Exit or disposal costs 
(restructuring)” (IAS 37) as more rules-oriented than U.S. GAAP does (ARB43_4, SFAS 34, SFAS 143, and 
SFAS 146, respectively). 
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reflect economic substance of transactions; on the other hand, they avoid it. Schipper 
(2003), however, argue that rules-based standards are likely to lead to more comparable 
and consistent financial statements. However, studies cannot reach a uniform conclusion 
which one is better than the other. To find optimal design of standards, for example, Gao 
et al (2017) examine the trade-offs between principles-based versus rules-based standards. 
They show that the optimal standard must necessarily contain both principles-based and 
rules-based elements because a rules-based standard induces evidence management 
(transaction structuring) whereas a principles-based induces abusive exercise of discretion. 
 
II.1.1 Principles-Based Accounting Standards 
 Written in clear, concise and plain language, principles-based standards provide 
users guidance with broad concepts and principles that aim to capture the underlying 
economics of transactions. They are also believed to better communicate users’ needs for 
clarity and transparency (DiPiazza et al. 2008). To improve the relevance and usefulness 
of financial reporting information, principles-based standards allow managers to 
accommodate the specifics of a transaction. Instead of seeking to identify the rule that 
directs how to record a transaction or make a disclosure, preparers pay more attention on 
the appropriate exercise of professional judgment and greater expertise, and, therefore, 
leading to higher earnings quality (FASB 2002; SEC 2003). For instance, Barth et al (2008) 
find firms that voluntarily adopt more principles-based standards such as IAS are 
associated with higher accounting quality (e.g. less earnings management, more timely loss 
recognition and more value relevance of earnings). Consistently, Folsom et al. (2017) find 
that firms using more principles-based standards are positively associated with higher 
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earnings informativeness, persistence, and predictability of future cash flows. It is also 
believed that under principles-based accounting standards, auditors are motivated to think 
deeply and understand all possible perspectives of the accounting issues, and to evaluate 
information thoroughly (Peytcheva et al 2014). 
 However, principles-based accounting standards per se may not guarantee higher 
accounting quality. Instead, the mindset of managers, audit committee members, and 
auditors must also possess both expert judgment and a desire for unbiased reporting under 
principles-based standards in order to reflect underlying economics of transactions (Maines 
et al 2003). For example, Jamal and Tan (2010) find that less aggressive reporting under 
principles-based standards exists only when the auditor is principles-oriented. Grenier et al 
(2015) also demonstrate that the efficacy of audit firm efforts depends on the precision of 
accounting standards, where increased litigation exposure under principles-based standards 
is manageable if audit firms can provide credible evidence to defend their professional 
judgments. 
 On the other hand, critics argue that principles-based standards leave room for 
different interpretations by preparers, leading to lower consensus among practitioners and 
potential lack of comparability between financial reports. For instance, Amer et al. (1994) 
find relatively high variance in audit managers’ interpretations of probability threshold, 
indicating standards sometimes are interpreted differently than intended in a given context. 
Prior research has shown principles-based standards provide too much discretion that could 
be exploited by management. Managers, at times, exercise their judgment opportunistically 
to manipulate earnings or hide information to achieve desired outcomes such as 
maximizing compensation, circumventing debt covenant violations, and avoiding stock 
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price declines (e.g. Healy and Wahlen 1999, Dechow and Skinner 2000). Moreover, with 
little guidance or structure provided on how to exercise professional judgment, it is also 
costly for auditors and enforcement agencies to understand and decide whether firm-
specific interpretations are presented correctly (Herz 2003). Consistent with this argument, 
Nelson et al. (2002) also find that auditors often compromise in client negotiations about 
managements’ interpretations when the standard is imprecise (principles-based). 
 
II.1.2 Rules-Based Accounting Standards  
 Characteristics of rules-based standards are generally described as standards that 
contain bright lines, examples, scope exceptions, and implementation guidance (FASB 
2002; Nelson 2003; Schipper 2003; SEC 2003). Such features extensively increase the 
precision and complexity of an accounting standard. Proponents claim that features such 
as “bright-line” thresholds and a high level of detail provide greater specificity and clarity 
on accounting for particular transactions. Therefore, rules-based standards increase 
communication accuracy and eliminate managerial opportunistic activities that lead to 
aggressive reporting choices by management (Nelson 2003). Schipper (2003) also points 
out that detailed guidance can potentially reduce after-the-fact disputes with the SEC of 
interpreting managements’ judgments and increase financial statement comparability and 
verifiability. Consistently, Boone et al. (2013) document that the SEC is more likely to 
comment on a registrant’s accounting if a standard is more rules-based. 
 There is little empirical research that examines whether decision makers alter their 
behavior depending on the precision and complexity of relevant accounting standards.6 
                                                          
6 Many studies in this area are performed in behavior analyses. 
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One reason for scarce empirical evidence in the literature is due to the lack of appropriate 
approach to capture rules-based characteristics in accounting standards. The existing 
experimental studies mostly operationalize rules-based standards by manipulating whether 
the standard contains bright-line thresholds. For example, Agoglia et al. (2011) find that 
CFOs are less likely to report aggressively (i.e., classifying leases as operating) when 
standards are principles-based. Consistently, Collins et al (2012) provide strong evidence 
that U.S. GAAP firms applying accounting for leases that contains bright-line guidance 
(i.e., ASC 840) are more likely to classify leases as operating than IFRS firms applying 
accounting for leases that does not contain bright line guidance. Kadous and Mercer (2012) 
find that rules-based characteristics can influence jury awards in lawsuits against auditors 
depending on the aggressiveness of financial reports and on the industry reporting norm. 
 However, some articulate that rules-based characteristics offer safe harbors to 
corporate managers. Specifically, Nelson et al. (2002) find managers are more likely to 
attempt earnings management via transaction structuring under rules-based standards 
where detailed guidance and alternatives make it harder to differentiate between an 
innocent misapplication of GAAP and an intentional violation. For example, Imhoff and 
Thomas (1988) provide evidence that managers responded to the precise criteria contained 
in SFAS No. 13 by structuring lease arrangements to qualify for operating lease treatment. 
In addition, rules-based characteristics decrease the use of professional judgment. They 
allow auditors just to follow “check the box” mentality when detailed rules fall safely 
within their literal scope yet put aside the intent and purpose of the rules. Nelson et al. 
(2002) find auditors are less likely to challenge transactions structuring under rules-based 
standards. Moreover, the emphasis on detailed guidance not only delays timely reporting 
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but also is deemed as a form of insurance against lawsuits, where compliance with rules is 
perceived to provide a defense against allegations of negligence or fraud (Maines et al 
2003; Melone 2004). Consistently, Mergenthaler (2011) finds the SEC is less likely to 
penalize a rules-based GAAP violation. Donelson et al. (2012) provide evidence that 
restatements related to rules-based standards are less likely to result in a litigation, 
indicating rules-based standards shield firms from potential litigation actions.7 
 
II.2 Why Does U.S. GAAP Contain More Rules-Based Standards? 
 Since the purpose of this study is to investigate the extent to which principles- (or 
rules-) based standards in US GAAP have implication for audit and accounting quality, it 
is important to briefly summarize the historical development of U.S. GAAP. This helps us 
understand why U.S. GAAP contains more rules-based standards compared to IFRS.   
 Established in 1973, FASB is designated to govern U.S. accounting practices for 
public and private companies and not-for-profit organizations that follow GAAP. To 
accomplish its mission that “to establish and improve standards of financial accounting and 
reporting for the guidance and education of the public, including issuers, auditors, and users 
of financial information”, FASB has been dedicated to “improve the usefulness of financial 
reporting by focusing on the primary characteristics of relevance and reliability and on the 
qualities of comparability and consistency” (FASB 1973). U.S. accounting standards are 
generally recognized as being constructed upon a set of broad principles derived from the 
                                                          
7  They propose two competing theories related to litigation under rules-based standards. One is the 
"protection" theory where rules-based standards shield firms from litigation so that firms are less likely to be 
sued or less likely to lose the case. Another is the "roadmap" theory, contending that the specificity of rules-
based standards provides a clear path to successful litigation so plaintiffs are more likely to file a suit or win 
the case. Their evidence supports the protection theory that rules-based standards appear to act as a safe 
harbor to shield firms from litigation. 
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FASB’s Conceptual Framework. The framework is useful to establish reasonable bounds 
for judgment in preparing financial information and to increase understanding of, and 
confidence in, financial information on the part of users of financial reports (FASB 2007). 
It also helps the public to understand the nature and limitations of information. For 
example, FASB Concepts Statements No. 4, Objectives of Financial Reporting by 
Nonbusiness Organizations; No. 5, Recognition and Measurement in Financial Statements 
of Business Enterprises; No. 6, Elements of Financial Statements, No. 7, Using Cash Flow 
Information and Present Value in Accounting Measurements; and No. 8, Conceptual 
Framework for Financial Reporting—Chapter 1, The Objective of General Purpose 
Financial Reporting, and Chapter 3, Qualitative Characteristics of Useful Financial 
Information. These accounting concepts set forth fundamentals on which accounting 
standards are based and provide a frame of reference to resolve accounting issues. 
 On the other hand, FASB creates standards for financial reporting as well as 
provides guidance on implementation of standards. In order to increase financial statement 
comparability and consistency, some “rules-based” features such as treatment and scope 
exceptions and detailed implementation guidance were then added to U.S. GAAP 
(Schipper 2003). She points out that scope exceptions and alternative treatments that 
deviate from the underlying principle of the standard to allow alternative accounting 
treatment for specific situations. Thus, they add to the length and complexity of the 
standards and subsequent implementation guidance. Transition exceptions, another rules-
based feature, highlights how U.S. GAAP changes over time by addressing the transition 
from an old standard to a new standard. Implementation guidance increase comparability  
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and verifiability and reduce the incidence of earnings management by increasing the 
consensus about interpretations or measurements in professional judgment. 
 To further examine why U.S. GAAP is more rules-based, Donelson et al. (2016) 
find that among five possible theories litigation risk and complexity in accounting issues 
influenced the development of rules-based accounting standards the most. With the 
existence of a strong legal regime in the U.S., complex transactions and complexity in 
accounting issues such as fair value measurement as well as the demand for rules-based 
standards are likely to persist. 
 
II.3 Converging to a More Principles-Based System 
 Concerns arise when U.S. accounting standards have become more rules-driven 
over the years. “Overloaded” standards are excessively complex and make it increasingly 
difficult for practitioners to understand. While legislatures set standards residing more 
toward the rules-based end of the spectrum, accounting failures such as Enron and 
WorldCom in early 2000s magnify the importance of informed professional judgment and 
expertise for implementation of standards. The urge for such reform in U.S. accounting 
standards on the adoption of a principles-based accounting system was soon reflected as a 
result of the "Norwalk Agreement" announced by the FASB and the International 
Accounting Standards Board (IASB) in October 2002. Shortly after, the SEC submitted a 
study in July 2003 that recommends U.S. accounting standards move toward a principles-
based regime. The discussion has been continuously brought up that whether U.S. GAAP 
should be led to the direction of more principles-based so as to focus on underlying 
economics of transactions and events, thereby improving the quality of financial reporting. 
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More attention is paid when the SEC expressed strong support to converge U.S. GAAP 
with international accounting standards in its “Roadmap for the Potential Use of Financial 
Statements Prepared in Accordance with International Financial Reporting Standards by 
U.S.”  (SEC, 2008).8  
 However, due to several irreconcilable fundamental differences between U.S. 
GAAP and IFRS, mainly the regulatory or legal environment (the presence of complex 
transactions or high litigation risk), the SEC decided to move away from the idea of 
convergence with IFRS (SEC Staff Report 2012). U.S. GAAP contains much industry 
guidance and exceptions that are needed for sound financial reporting in the U.S. landscape 
due to a more litigious culture that the U.S. financial reporting system cannot function over 
the long run without clean unambiguous standards or precise guidance (FASB 2012).  
 
III. HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT  
 The majority of the extant literature examine the influence of principles- and/or 
rules- based standards on firms’ financial reporting decisions. Little empirical research has 
been conducted on whether the nature of standards affect auditor decision-making and 
audit quality, although the link between audit quality and financial reporting quality has 
been well established in the prior literature (e.g., Barton, 2005; Ashbaugh et al. 2003). 
Research on auditors is motivated by the assumption that they provide a useful service 
demanded across investors. Auditor needs to determine whether information reported in 
                                                          
8 Short-term convergence projects such as “fair value option for financial instruments” and “research and 
development” as well as major joint projects for example “business combinations” and “fair value 
measurement” were completed. Project milestones such as the elimination of the reconciliation requirement 
are also achieved over the years. Moreover, accounting standards for “revenue recognition”, “leases”, along 
with other topics that identified as major joint projects have been recently amended in U.S. Accounting 
Standards Codification. 
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financial statements is reasonable and whether the reporting choice is appropriate for a 
particular transaction. High audit quality increases the credibility of the financial reports 
through greater assurance that the financial statements faithfully represent the firm’s 
underlying economic substance (Dechow et al. 2010). Similarly, Kim et al (2012) find 
increased financial reporting quality through the adoption of IFRS has led to higher audit 
fees in EU countries. However, concerns articulate that increased reliance on professional 
judgment from principles-based standards makes it more difficult and costly to detect 
violations. Nelson et al (2002) find auditors often compromise in client negotiations in 
principles-based accounting standards. Sennetti et al (2011) document that jurors evaluate 
auditors more negatively if auditors have relied on a principles-based accounting standard, 
even if this standard is properly applied. Cohen et al (2013) provide indirect evidence that 
auditors are more likely to constrain aggressive reporting when standards are principles-
based under both stronger (U.S.) and weaker regulatory regimes. Another study by 
Peytcheva et al (2014) propose a theoretical model that principles-based accounting 
standards increase auditors’ expectation of having to justify to others the decision process 
used, regardless of the outcome of the decision. 
 However, there is no direct empirical study that examines how the nature of 
accounting standards may affect auditor’s assessed audit risk. To fill up this gap, I look 
into audit quality from both the audit inputs and the outcomes. In the first test, I examine 
the association between audit inputs and the precision and complexity of relevant 
accounting standards. Namely, whether auditors spend more time and efforts on audit 
engagements when clients apply more principles-bases accounting standards. Audit inputs 
such as time and efforts are proxied by audit fees as they are not directly observable. On 
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the one hand, auditors may charge higher audit fees to mitigate increased level in 
engagement risk because the application of principles-bases standards demands more 
professional judgment and greater expertise. On the other hand, using more principles- 
based standards are likely to increase accounting quality because auditors and managers 
need to consider the economic substance of transactions. So, it could reduce audit fees 
(Kim et al. 2012). Taken together, I propose the first hypothesis in the null form as follows. 
H1: There is no association between firms applying more principles-based 
standards and audit fees. 
 Audit inputs may or may not completely translate into audit outcomes. 
Restatements, as an outcome of the audit process, are one of the most commonly used 
proxies to measure actual audit quality in the literature. Accounting restatements occur 
when the auditor erroneously issued an unqualified opinion on materially misstated 
financial statements.  For example, restatements are used to examine whether audit quality 
is associated with auditor independence, audit committee characteristics, and auditor 
industry specialization (e.g. Kinney Jr. et al. 2004, Abbott et al. 2004, Agrawal and Chadha 
2005, Archambeault et al. 2008, Chin and Chi 2009). 
 Yet, no empirical work explores whether principles- (or rules-) based standards 
affects the outcome of audit process in the presence of accounting misstatements. Caplan 
and Kirschenheiter (2004) find auditors prefer bright-line standards if auditor expertise is 
unobservable to investors and the average level of auditor expertise increases under bright-
line standards. In case of observable expertise, expert auditors prefer principles-based 
standards, whereas auditors without such expertise prefer bright-line standards. On the one 
hand, rules make the standards more complex and difficult to apply, which potentially 
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shields firms from being investigated. Consequently, managers can defend rules-based 
violations as innocent misstatements due to the complex nature in the standards. Donelson 
et al. (2012) find that restatements that are associated with rules-based standards are less 
likely to result in a litigation. On the other hand, auditors may "check boxes" without 
looking into the economic substance of transactions and, thus, are more likely to misstate 
financial information. However, in an international study by Henderson and O'Brien 
(2017), they find that the financial reporting outcome is relatively insensitive to either 
applying a principle or bright-line standard regarding the use of capital lease treatment 
among four countries: Australia, Canada, the UK, and the US. Overall, the impact of 
principles- (or rules-) based standards on restatements is inconclusive. I, therefore, propose 
the following hypothesis without predicted sign (stated in the null form). 
H2: There is no association between firms applying more principles-based 
standards and accounting misstatements. 
 Despite the extant literature that explores earnings attributes influenced by 
characteristics in accounting standards, there are also extensive studies that suggest timely 
loss recognition (TLR) to serve as an important factor to earnings quality. For example, 
TLR is associated with favorable outcomes such as reduced borrowing costs and superior 
capital investment decisions (Zhang 2008; Francis and Martin 2009). Barth et al (2008) 
find that firms that use IAS have less earnings management, more timely loss recognition 
and more value relevance of earnings. Folsom et al. (2017) document that firms using more 
principles-based standards are associated with more earnings informativeness, persistence, 
and better the predictability of future cash flows. Nevertheless, the influence of rules-based 
or principles-based standards on asymmetric timeliness remains unclear. I expect firms 
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using more principles-based standards likely to recognize loss in accounting earnings on a 
more timely basis. This is because principles-based standards likely to recognize the 
economic substance of transactions and therefore are more likely to recognize economic 
loss in accounting earnings on a more timely basis. This leads to my third hypothesis (stated 
in the alternative form): 
H3: Firms applying more principles-based standards report negative 
earnings surprises in a more timely manner. 
 
IV. RESEARCH DESIGN AND SAMPLE SELECTION 
IV.1 Rules-Based Continuum (RBC) Measure 
 To quantify rules-based characteristics in accounting standards, I employ the RBC 
measure by Mergenthaler (2011). Specifically, the measure uses four distinct indicators 
refined from authoritative sources in the U.S. standards-setting process, mostly the FASB 
(2002) and the SEC (2003), to catch the extent to which each accounting standard contains 
rules-based characteristic. These indicators are: (1) bright-line thresholds (BRIGHT), (2) 
scope and legacy exceptions (SCOPE),9 (3) large volumes of implementation guidance 
(GUIDE), and (4) a high level of detail (DETAIL).10 All four indicators are dichotomous, 
denoting the presence or absence of its respective characteristic. The sum of four indicators 
comes to an RBC1 score that ranges from 0 to 4, denoting standards from the most 
principles-based to most rules-based standard. 
                                                          
9 A list of relevant keywords is identified to present the indicators among accounting standards in Appendix 
B.  
10 See Appendix B for a detailed discussion of each indicator. 
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 Further, to standardize each standard relative to all other standards, RBC2 is then 
proposed to factor in the mean and variance adjusted composite, using the following 
equation: 
𝑅𝐵𝐶2𝑗𝑡 = ∑
𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑖𝑗𝑡 − 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑖̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅
𝜎𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑖
4
𝑖=1
 
where the indicator i for standard j in year t (𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑖𝑗𝑡) is adjusted for the mean (𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑖̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅) and 
variance of indicator i in all standards (𝜎𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑖). RBC2 is the sum of all four mean-and-
variance-adjusted indicators for each standard in year t. RBC2 puts more weight to the 
extreme values and it measures to what extent one particular rules-based characteristic in 
a standard is relative to all other standards. Thus, higher RBC2 score identifies more 
extreme rules-based characteristics in standards. 
 
IV.2 Principles-Based Score (PSCORE) Measure 
IV.2.1 Identifying the Keyword List 
 To examine how and to what extent firms rely on principles-based standards, I 
adopt the PSCORE measure following Folsom et al. (2017). Despite the fact that U.S. 
GAAP applies to all public and private companies as well as the not-for-profit 
organizations, not every accounting standard is necessarily affecting each firm equally. A 
firm’s adoption of applicable standards depends on the nature of the business and various 
transactions involved, whereas the relevant impact of standards’ implementation depends 
on management’s competence and intention. 
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 First, to determine what standards each firm is complying with, I construct a list of 
keywords for each ASC topic.11 I obtain and continue to use the keywords previously 
identified by Folsom et al. (2017) only if the ASC topics can be related to the FASB 
pronouncements prior to 2009.12 For those cannot be successfully located back to the 
FASB pronouncements, I adopt two most commonly used automatic keyword extraction 
methods in text mining, TextRank and RAKE, to extract keywords and phrases among the 
new Codification system (Mihalcea and Tarau 2004, Rose et al 2010). 13 For example, ASC 
820, previously FAS 157 (first effective in 2007), prescribes Fair Value Measurements. 
Using RAKE method, the first two sequences of words the algorithm provides are 
“reporting entity measures fair value using another valuation technique” and “fair value 
measurement shall reflect market participants expectations”. I then identify (1) “fair value” 
within five words (preceding or following) of “measur*”, 14  (2) “market participants” 
within five words of “expectations”, and (3) “valuation technique” as keywords for this 
standard. With a deeper look into ASC 820 I add another keyword, “observable input*”. 
Next, to validate keywords identified can appropriately locate to the unique accounting 
standard, I search the keywords in the Codification system to make sure ASC 820 is 
returned as the first result. 
 After compiling the keyword list, I then search for the appearance of these 
keywords within entities’ 10-K filings. For instance, ASC 230 (previously SFAS 95) 
                                                          
11 Appendix C provides a list of detailed keywords identified in each ASC topic. 
12 The Codification system provides interactive means to map topics from pre-codification period. 
13 Keywords used in Folsom et al. (2017) were identified from the FASB pronouncements up to 2006. 
14 The keywords ending with * represent stemming or root words. Variation forms are also captured by textual 
algorithms. For example, the search for keyword “measur*” will return variations such as “measuring”, 
“measure”, and “measurement”. 
23  
governs Statement of Cash Flows. Keywords identified for this standard are (1) 
“operating”, “investing”, or “financing” “activities”, (2) “cash” “receipts” or “payments”, 
and (3) “direct” or “indirect” “method”. I assume every time these keywords appear in 
entities’ annual reports, Topic 230 is referenced. I also search the commonly used titles of 
this standard such as “SFAS 95”, “FASB Statement No. 95”, ASC 230, and Topic 230. 
Moreover, through a closer inspection of firms’ 10-K filings, I notice firms often cite the 
amendments to accountings standards, now known as the Accounting Standards Update 
(ASU). Therefore, keywords for the amendments to ASC 230 such as “ASU 2010-08”, 
“ASU 2012-05”, and “ASU 2014-08” are considered and searched as well.  
 
IV.2.2 Relative Importance (REL_IMP) Measure 
 Then, I sum up the total number of times the keywords are mentioned in a firm’s 
annual report. To analyze cross-sectional variation of firms’ reliance on principles-based 
standards, I standardize the raw keyword counts by adjusting for mean and variance 
composite following Folsom et al. (2017). This process considers the relative importance 
of the individual standard among all firms, where the relative importance is calculated as 
follows:  
𝑅𝐸𝐿_𝐼𝑀𝑃𝑖𝑡𝑠 =
𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚_𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡 𝑖𝑡𝑠 − 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚_𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡 𝑡𝑠̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅
𝜎𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚_𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡 𝑡𝑠
 
where I first calculate the raw keyword count of firm i for standard s in year t. Then, I 
adjust for the average number of times all other firms mention the keywords for standard s 
in year t (𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚_𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑡𝑠̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ) and variance in all firms for standard s in year t (𝜎𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚_𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑡𝑠). 
To avoid negative or zero weights from this standardization process, the minimum 
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standardized score is added to back to REL_IMP measure for standard s in year t so that it 
captures cross-sectional variation of firms’ reliance on principles-based standards. For 
example, if firm i doesn’t mention standard s in year t, it will receive the most negative 
weigh in relative importance measure as comparing to others mention standard s at least 
once. By adding back its score, firm i eventually becomes zero, which indeed receives 
minimum impact by standard s in year t. 
 
IV.2.3 Firm-Level PSCORE Measure 
 Following Folsom et al. (2017), I then map REL_IMP score to RBC1 measure to 
construct firm-level instrument, PSCORE. It measures the extent to which a firm’s annual 
10-K filing contains principles-based characteristics and the influence of each standard on 
the firm. Specifically, PSCORE is the product of relative importance score of firm i for 
standard s in year t and the standard s’ corresponding RBC1 score in year t. The equation 
of the total PSCORE is as follows: 
𝑃𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸𝑖𝑡 = (−1) × ∑(𝑅𝐸𝐿_𝐼𝑀𝑃𝑖𝑡𝑠 × 𝑅𝐵𝐶1 𝑡𝑠)
𝑆
𝑆=1
 
multiplying by -1, PSCORE increases from firms reporting more rules-based standards to 
firms most relying on principles-based standards (PSCORE score, the non-positive 
number, closest to 0). Firms applying more principles-based accounting standards report 
higher PSCORE values. Otherwise, lower (higher) PSCORE indicates more reliance on the 
rules-based (principles-based) standards. 
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IV.3 Research Models and Key Variables 
 To test my first hypothesis that examines the influence of principles-based vs rules-
based standards on the auditors assessed level of inputs during the audit process, I regress 
firm i’s audit fees on the firm-specific PSCORE in year t and control for variables following 
prior literature. The OLS model is as follows: 
 
LnAFit = β0+ β1PSCOREit + β2BIG_4it + β3LNTAit +β4LEVit + β5LOSSit + β6ROAit 
+ β7GEOSEGit + β8BUSSEGit + Industry/Year FE + εit   (1) 
 
 The dependent variables LnAFit is the nature logarithm of firm i’s audit fees in year 
t. A positive coefficient on β1 indicates firms relying more on the principles-based 
standards pay greater audit fees. Otherwise, negative β1 means firms applying more rules-
based standards pay more audit fees. Prior research shows that audit quality is associated 
with company characteristics such as company size, financial performance, and stress. 
Therefore, I control for the natural logarithm of total assets (LNTAit), leverage (LEVit), a 
dummy for reporting losses (LOSSit), return on assets (ROAit), the number of geographic 
and business segments (GEOSEGit, and BUSSEGit). I also control for auditor size (BIG_4it), 
following Seetharaman et al. (2002), Choi et al. (2009), and Dao et al. (2012). Industry/ 
year fixed effects are also considered for correlation across the time and industries. 
 To test my next hypothesis regarding the likelihood of reporting accounting 
misstatements under different standards characteristics, I regress the restatement dummy 
on the firm-specific PSCORE in year t and other control variables. The logistic model is as 
follows: 
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Restateit = β0+ β1PSCOREit +β2BIG_Nit + β3BIG_4it * PSCOREit + β4LNTAit 
+β5LEVit + β6LOSSit + β7ROAit + β8GEOSEGit +β9BUSSEGit + 
Industry/Year FE + εit      (2) 
 
 Restatements (Restateit) equals 1 if company i’s audited financial statements in year 
t are subsequently restated, and 0 otherwise. Suggested by prior literature that auditor 
characteristics play influential role on the audit outcome (Francis et al. 2005, Numan and 
Wilekens 2012, Fung et al. 2012), I include variables to control for auditor characteristics 
such as auditor size (BIG_4it). The interaction terms of BIG_4it * PSCOREit captures the 
potential incremental effect of auditor size if any on the likelihood of reporting accounting 
misstatements under principles-based versus rules-based standards. A positive coefficient 
of β1 suggests firms report more accounting misstatements when relying more on 
principles-based accounting standard. A negative coefficient of interaction β3 shows firms 
applying more principles-based standards with Big 4 auditors are less likely to report 
accounting misstatements. LNTAit is employed to measure client size. Various variables, 
LEVit, LOSSit, ROAit, GEOSEGit, and BUSSEGit, are controlled for financial stress and client 
complexity. Following prior research, I also control for industry/ year fixed effects in this 
test.  
 The last hypothesis investigates the asymmetric timeliness in loss recognition under 
the influence of rules-based or principles-based standards. I employ most frequently used 
measure of timely loss recognition, the reverse earnings-returns regression from Basu 
(1997): 
Ei,t = β0 + β1Dit + β2Retit + β3PSCOREit + β4Dit *Retit + β5Retit * PSCOREit 
+β6Dit * Retit * PSCOREit + εit           (3) 
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 The “bad” news represented by losses should be reflected into returns quicker than 
the "good" news in an efficient market, where dummy variable Dit equals 1 if firm reports 
a loss (Retit <0). A higher β4 implies more timely recognition of the incurred losses in 
earnings. Interacted with PSCORE, the variable of interest in this test is Dit * Retit * 
PSCOREit which captures the incremental influence of principles-based standards on 
firms’ reporting quality. I expect the coefficient on the interaction term β6 to be positive 
that firms applying more principles-based standards will report 'bad news' more quickly 
than 'good news', where prior literature suggests that accounting quality could be improved 
by eliminating alternative accounting methods that are less reflective of firms’ economic 
performance.  
 
IV.4 Sample Selection 
 The Accounting Standards Codification is the current single source of U.S. GAAP. 
I obtain the Codification via the FASB Accounting Standards Codification website 
(asc.fasb.org). Following Mergenthaler (2011), I also obtain authoritative standards prior 
to 2009, including Accounting Research Bulletins (ARBs), Accounting Principles Board 
opinions (APBs), Statements of Financial Accounting Standards (SFAS), Statement of 
Financial Accounting Concepts (SFAC) and the SEC Staff Accounting Bulletin (SAB) 
101. 15  
  The sample period begins in 2009. I use 2009 as the base year to construct RBC 
score where I can locate U.S. accounting standards in the form of “FASB Pronouncements” 
                                                          
15 The Codification system is effective in the first interim and annual periods ending after September 15, 
2009. 
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to ASC system. I then update the amendments issued in the form of Accounting Standards 
Updates from FASB’s website to their corresponding ASC topics every year from 2009-
2014, with the average of 16 updates a year. My sample period ends in 2014 but I extend 
the restated period until 2016 to factor in the time lag between the occurrences of financial 
misstatements and subsequent financial restatements. 
 Panel A of Table 1 presents the sample selection criteria. Initially, I obtained 62,291 
annual reports between 2009 and 2014 from the SEC Edgar database. Due to the excessive 
volume of 10-K filings, I decide to only include the S&P 500 companies in my current 
research.16 After excluding financial institutions, I then apply textual analysis technique to 
remove irrelevant information in each annual report such as html tags and 
corrupted/unreadable characters. This leaves me with 2,263 annual reports from 394 
distinct companies. I obtain financial data from COMPUSTAT and audit information such 
as auditors, audit fees, and restatements from AuditAnalytic. I deleted 853 firm-year 
observations without audit and financial data and winsorized ROA and LEV at the 1 and 
99 percent levels. I also require firms to report consecutive six years’ 10-K filings. My 
primary sample consists of 1,410 firm-year observations among 235 S&P 500 companies. 
The return data is collected from CRSP. After deleting missing return data, the sample for 
the timely loss recognition test has 228 firms with 1,322 firm year observations. Panel B 
describes the number of S&P 500 firms by 2-digit SIC industry codes. While “Business 
Services” and “Electric, Gas, & Sanitary Services” are the two industries that have the most  
 
                                                          
16 The original download from Edgar database includes 62,291 of 10-K filings from 2009 to 2014, exceeding 
555 GB. 
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numbers of S&P 500 firms (27 and 24 companies, relatively), over 80% of the industries 
have less than 10 companies. 
 
V. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
V.1 Descriptive Statistics 
 First, to validate my RBC1 measure under the Codification system, I compare my 
RBC1 scores in 2009 with scores used in Mergenthaler (2011). Untabulated analysis reveals 
that, among 78 out of 96 ASC Topics successfully located to FASB pronouncements, sixty-
six are perfectly matched with Mergenthaler (2011) scores, while the rest are slightly 
different (9 out of 11 are due to word count indicator calculation). Table 2 lists the RBC1 
scores for major ASC Topics between 2009 and 2014. Consistent with Donelson et al 
(2016), I find “ASC 330 Inventory”, “ASC 420 Exit or Disposal Cost Obligations”, “ASC 
835 Interest” are ranked as most principles-based standards. Accounting for “Intangibles - 
Goodwill and Other” (ASC 350), “Income Taxes” (ASC 740), “Consolidation” (Topic 
810), “Leases” (ASC 840) are the most rules-oriented. Over the years, RBC1 scores seem 
to stay relatively sticky except for the rise in 2014 as shown in Figure 1. The increase 
confirms the concern that existing or newly added standards now contain more rules-based 
characteristics with the Accounting Standard Updates. Table 3 shows the list of RBC2 
scores that includes the mean and variance adjusted composite of RBC1. Figure 2 shows 
that different from the trend of RBC1, RBC2 continues to decline until 2013, indicating that 
U.S. GAAP became less rules-based before 2013, although RBC2 increases significantly in 
2014. Consistent with Figure 1, existing or newly added standards now contain more rules-
based characteristics with the ASUs. 
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 Panel A of Table 4 summarizes the descriptive information on the variables. 
Ninety-nine percent of the firms employ Big 4 auditors. Also, the auditor turnover is very 
low that only five firms switch from one Big 4 to another. Since I focus on S&P 500 
companies, the firms are relatively large (LNTA), more complex (GEOSEG and BUSSEG), 
and have less financial stress (LEV, ROA, and LOSS). Panel B presents a correlation matrix 
for variables in the audit fee and restatement models. Nature logarithm of audit fees (LNAF) 
and PSCORE have a Pearson correlation of -0.34 (Spearman -0.40) while PSCORE isn’t 
correlated with restatements in the test. In addition, as expected, audit fees are most 
strongly correlated with firm size (Pearson 0.77, Spearman 0.76). Panel C describes the 
average PSCORE based on the 2-digit SIC industry portfolios. It is essential to understand 
the impact of accounting standards applicable to different industries. Among 43 industries 
in total, “Electric, Gas, & Sanitary Services” seems to be the most rules-oriented during 
the sample period industry (Mean PSCORE = -86.50), while “Transportation Services” 
industry applies the most principles-based standards (Mean PSCORE = -20.03). Industries 
like "Nonmetallic Minerals, Except Fuels", "Industrial Machinery & Equipment", 
"Furniture & Homefurnishings Stores", and "Metal, Mining" are also using more rules-
based standards comparing to industries such as "Building Materials & Gardening 
Supplies", "Automative Dealers & Service Stations", "General Merchandise Stores", and 
"Water Transportation" are complying with more principles- based standards. 
 Next, the time trend for PSCORE is shown in Figure 3. Overall, there does not 
appear to be a clear trend over time. PSCORE dropped since 2009, indicating firms were 
complying with less principles-based standards. Later, it holds relatively stable from 2011 
to 2013 with a slightly increase in 2014. Such increase in PSCORE suggests that firms are 
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actually applying more principles-based standards despite the fact that RBC1 has increased 
to more rules-based in 2014 as mentioned in Figure 1. Figure 4A displays the PSCORE 
among Big 4 audit firms over the sample period. Taken together with the finding in Figure 
4B, it appears that companies having KPMG or Ernst & Young rely more on the principles-
based standards and they pay less audit fees, while Deloitte and PricewaterhouseCoopers 
have clients applying less principles-based standards and they charge higher audit fees.  
 
V.2 Regression analyses  
Table 5 reports the regression results for audit fee model. The coefficient of 
PSCORE is negative and significant, meaning PSCORE is negatively associated with the 
audit fees (coefficient = -0.001, t = -1.98). This result is consistent with the finding in Big 
4 audit firms that suggests firms applying more principles-based accounting standards tend 
to pay less audit fees. Firm complexity (GEOSEG, BUSSEG) and size (LNTA) are all 
positively associated with audit fees.17 Higher audit fees mean that auditors assess higher 
audit risk when clients relying more rules-based standards where management can 
manipulate earnings through transaction structuring. In other words, because firms 
applying more principles-based standards need to exercise more professional judgment and 
greater expertise their financial information tend to represent the underlying economic 
substance of transactions. Such firms report higher accounting quality and are assessed at 
lower audit risk. The net effect shows that firms applying more principles-based accounting 
standards are charged with less audit fees. In fact, this result is consistent with the findings 
                                                          
17 In untabulated analysis, my results are robust if using audit specialists (measured as auditors’ market share 
at 2-digis SIC) to proxy auditor characteristics. 
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from prior experimental studies where CFO are less likely to report aggressively and 
auditors are more likely to constrain aggressive reporting under principles-based 
accounting standards (Agoglia et al 2011, Cohen et al 2013).  
Results for the restatement model are presented in Table 6. PSCORE is negative 
but insignificant associated with restatements. Coefficients of Big 4 and return on assets 
are positive but insignificant and all other variables are negative and insignificant at any 
conventional levels. The results show that PSCORE is not associated with the likelihood of 
reporting accounting misstatements, suggesting that whether firms applying rules- or 
principles-based standards do not affect the audit outcome. This result needs to be 
interpreted with care because the likelihood of misstatements should be fewer for S&P 500 
companies. In fact, only 29.8% of these firms restate their financial statements during 
2009-2014.18 
Overall, I find evidence that PSCORE is negatively associated with the audit fees 
but not related to restatements, suggesting that auditors do consider assessed level of inputs, 
the precision, and complexity of relevant standards but the nature of accounting standards 
doesn’t affect the outcome of audit process. 
Next, I measure earnings quality by timely loss recognition. Panel A of Tables 7 
presents the descriptive information about the variables in the model and Panel B reports 
the correlation matrix. The interaction of D * Ret has negative correlations of -0.08 with 
earnings while the interaction of R * PSCORE and D*R*PSCORE are both positively 
correlated with earnings (Spearman =0.14 and 0.08, respectively). 
 
                                                          
18 In the sample of S&P 500 companies, 70 out of 235 firms reported 116 restatements during 2009-2014. 
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Table 8 shows that PSCORE is positively associated with earnings at the 5% level 
(coefficient = 0.000, t = 2.12). The incremental coefficient on negative returns, D * Ret, is 
0.11 and statistically significant at the 5% level, indicating that on average sample firms 
report losses in a more timely fashion than gains. The total timeliness coefficient is 0.077 
(the sum of 0.11 and -0.033). The interaction of return and PSCORE is negative and 
significant at the 1% level (coefficient = -0.001, t = -3.37). However, the variable of 
interest, the interaction of negative returns and PSCORE is positive but not statistically 
significant at any conventional levels.  
 Overall, the results indicate that PSCORE doesn’t impact on timeliness in loss 
recognition, indicating that timely loss recognition (TLR) is insensitive with firms’ choice 
of applying more principles- (or rules-) based accounting standards. 
 
VI. CONCLUSIONS, CONTRIBUTIONS, AND LIMITATIONS 
 This study examines the effects of the nature of accounting standards on audit 
quality and earnings attributes. Specifically, whether firms’ reliance on more principles- 
(or rules-) based standards are associated with higher audit fees, the incidence of 
accounting misstatements, and more timely loss recognition. I employ the RBC measure 
following Mergenthaler (2011) to capture rules-oriented features contained in each FASB 
ASC topics. Next, using keyword extraction approach developed by Folsom et al. (2017), 
I construct the firm-level instrument, PSCORE, to map the RBC scores to firms’ annual 
reports. I find that auditors consider the precision and complexity in accounting standards 
when assessing the level of audit inputs, but the nature of accounting standards doesn’t 
affect the outcome of audit process. In addition, the timeliness in loss recognition is 
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insensitive to firms’ choice of applying more principles- (or rules-) based accounting 
standards. Overall, the empirical results suggest that the optimal blend of accounting 
standards must necessarily contain both principles-based and rules-based characteristics. 
 This study contributes to the extant literature in several ways. First, this is the first 
study to provide direct empirical evidence on the association between the nature of 
accounting standards and audit quality. Prior research provides extensive indirect evidence, 
mostly in lease classification experimental settings, to evaluate the effects of principles-
based versus rules-based characteristics on audit quality such as jury verdicts against 
auditors, the strength of audit committee, and the strength of financial regulatory regime 
(Agoglia et al. 2011, Kadous and Mercer 2012, Cohen et al. 2013). Second, prior studies 
(e.g. Mergenthaler 2011, Folsom et al. 2017) provide evidence on the effects of principles-
based versus rules-based characteristics on properties of earnings. This paper complements 
this steam of earnings quality literature by examining asymmetric timeliness in loss 
recognition. Third, this is the first study to empirically identify rules-based characteristics 
in U.S. GAAP under the FASB ASC topical categories. Finally, this paper also contributes 
greatly to the continuous debate over whether to implement principles-oriented reporting 
system even after the convergence process. The results of this study should be of interest 
to preparers, auditors, U.S. standards setters, and accounting researchers. 
 This dissertation has several limitations. First, due to the excessive volume in 
companies’ 10-k filings my dissertation emphasizes on S&P 500 firms and the sample 
period ends in 2014. In future extensions, it is worthwhile to investigate all U.S. companies 
with more recent changes in accounting standards (e.g. lease classification, revenue 
recognition). Second, both macro-level RBC score and firm-level PSCORE measure are 
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relatively new instruments that may need further refinement. RBC measure may not capture 
all possible characterizations in principles and rules. Finally, although this dissertation 
provides evidence that contributes to the debate over how principles- and rules-based 
standards impact the audit process and financial reporting, I draw no conclusion on the 
precedence of principles- based standards over rules-based standards. 
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TABLE 1 
Sample Selection 
 
  
 
Panel A: Number of Observations 
 Firm 
Observations 
Firm-Year 
Observations  
Annual reports between 2009 and 2014: 10,580 62,291 
Less: Firms are not S&P 500 (10,148) (59,892) 
Subtotal 432 2,399 
Less: Firms are financial institutions (SIC 6000) (38) (136) 
Subtotal 394 2,263 
Less: Firms with missing variables; LEV and ROA 
winsorized at 1% and 99%. 
(159) (853) 
Primary Analysis Sample 235 1,410 
Less:  Firms missing return data (7) (88) 
Loss Recognition Sample 228 1,322 
Data Source: Compustat, CRSP, and AuditAnalytics.    
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TABLE 1 
Sample Selection 
(Continued) 
 
Panel B: Number of S&P 500 Firms by 2-digit SIC Industries 
10 Metal, Mining 1 44 Water Transportation 1 
13 Oil & Gas Extraction 10 45 Transportation by Air 5 
14 Nonmetallic Minerals, Except Fuels 1 47 Transportation Services 2 
15 General Building Contractors 2 48 Communications 6 
16 Heavy Construction, Except Building 1 49 Electric, Gas, & Sanitary Services 24 
20 Food & Kindred Products 15 50 Wholesale Trade – Durable Goods 4 
21 Tobacco Products 2 51 Wholesale Trade – Nondurable Goods 3 
22 Textile Mill Products 1 52 Building Materials & Gardening Supplies 5 
23 Apparel & Other Textile Products 4 53 General Merchandise Stores 7 
25 Furniture & Fixtures 1 54 Food Stores 1 
26 Paper & Allied Products 2 55 Automative Dealers & Service Stations 3 
28 Chemical & Allied Products 18 56 Apparel & Accessory Stores 7 
29 Petroleum & Coal Products 4 57 Furniture & Homefurnishings Stores 1 
30 Rubber & Miscellaneous Plastics Products 2 58 Eating & Drinking Places 4 
31 Leather & Leather Products 1 59 Miscellaneous Retail 5 
34 Fabricated Metal Products 3 67 Holding & Other Investment Offices 1 
35 Industrial Machinery & Equipment 11 72 Personal Services 1 
36 Electronic & Other Electric Equipment 14 73 Business Services 27 
37 Transportation Equipment 7 78 Motion Pictures 1 
38 Instruments & Related Products 19 80 Health Services 2 
40 Railroad Transportation 3 87 Engineering & Management Services 2 
42 Trucking & Warehousing 1   Total 235 
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TABLE 2 
List of RBC1 Scores from 2009 to 2014 
 
ASC # ASC Topic 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
105 Generally Accepted Accounting Principles 0 0 0 0 0 0 
205 Presentation of Financial Statements 0 0 0 0 0 1 
210 Balance Sheet 0 0 0 0 0 0 
220 
Income Statement—Reporting Comprehensive 
Income 1 1 1 1 1 1 
225 Income Statement 1 1 1 1 1 1 
230 Statement of Cash Flows 0 0 0 0 0 1 
235 Notes to Financial Statements 0 0 0 0 0 0 
250 Accounting Changes and Error Corrections 0 0 0 0 0 0 
255 Changing Prices 0 0 0 0 0 0 
260 Earnings Per Share 1 1 1 1 1 1 
270 Interim Reporting 0 0 0 0 0 0 
272 Limited Liability Entities 2 2 2 2 2 2 
280 Segment Reporting 2 2 2 2 2 2 
310 Receivables 0 0 0 0 0 0 
320 Investments - Debt and Equity Securities 2 2 2 2 2 2 
323 Investments - Equity Method and Joint Ventures 3 3 3 3 3 3 
330 Inventory 0 0 0 0 0 0 
350 Intangibles - Goodwill and Other 3 3 3 3 3 3 
360 Property, Plant, and Equipment 2 2 2 2 2 2 
405 Liabilities 2 2 2 2 2 2 
410 Asset Retirement and Environmental Obligations 1 1 1 1 1 1 
420 Exit or Disposal Cost Obligations 0 0 0 0 0 0 
440 Commitments 1 1 1 1 1 1 
450 Contingencies 1 1 1 1 1 1 
470 Debt 2 2 2 2 2 3 
480 Distinguishing Liabilities from Equity 1 1 1 1 1 1 
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TABLE 2 (Continued) 
 
ASC # ASC Topic 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
505 Equity 1 1 1 1 1 1 
605 Revenue Recognition 2 2 2 2 2 2 
715 Compensation - Retirement Benefits 3 3 3 3 3 3 
718 Compensation - Stock Compensation 2 2 2 2 2 2 
720 Other Expenses 0 0 0 0 0 0 
730 Research and Development 1 1 1 1 1 1 
740 Income Taxes 3 3 3 3 3 3 
805 Business Combinations 2 2 2 2 2 2 
810 Consolidation 3 3 3 3 3 3 
815 Derivatives and Hedging 3 3 2 2 2 2 
820 Fair Value Measurements 2 2 2 2 2 2 
825 Financial Instruments 1 1 1 1 1 1 
830 Foreign Currency Matters 1 1 1 1 1 1 
835 Interest 0 0 0 0 0 0 
840 Leases 4 4 4 4 4 4 
845 Nonmonetary Transactions 1 1 1 1 1 1 
850 Related Party Disclosures 1 1 1 1 1 1 
852 Reorganizations 0 0 0 0 0 0 
855 Subsequent Events 1 1 1 1 1 1 
860 Transfers and Servicing 1 1 1 1 1 1 
912 Contractors - Federal Government 0 0 0 0 0 0 
915 Development Stage Entities 0 0 0 0 0 0 
920 Entertainment - Broadcasters 0 0 0 0 0 0 
922 Entertainment - Cable Television 0 0 0 0 0 0 
924 Entertainment - Casinos 0 0 0 0 0 0 
926 Entertainment - Films 0 0 0 0 0 0 
928 Entertainment - Music 0 0 0 0 0 0 
932 Extractive Activities - Oil and Gas 2 2 2 2 2 2 
944 Financial Services - Insurance 1 1 1 1 1 1 
946 Financial Services - Investment Companies 0 0 0 0 0 2 
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TABLE 2 (Continued) 
 
ASC # ASC Topic 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
948 Financial Services - Mortgage Banking 1 1 1 1 1 1 
950 Financial Services - Title Plant 0 0 0 0 0 0 
952 Franchisors 0 0 0 0 0 0 
954 Health Care Entities 3 3 3 3 3 3 
958 Not-for-Profit Entities 1 1 1 1 1 1 
960 Plan Accounting - Defined Benefit Pension Plans 0 0 0 0 0 0 
962 
Plan Accounting - Defined Contribution Pension 
Plans 0 0 0 0 0 0 
970 Real Estate - General 1 1 1 1 1 1 
976 Real Estate - Retail Land 3 3 3 3 3 3 
980 Regulated Operations 1 1 1 1 1 1 
985 Software 2 2 2 2 2 2 
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FIGURE 1 
Changes of RBC1 in ASC Topics 
 
 
 
  
 
Figure 1 plots the changes of RBC1 scores in ASC Topics between 2009-2014. 
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TABLE 3 
List of RBC2 Scores from 2009 to 2014 
ASC # ASC Topics 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
105 Generally Accepted Accounting Principles -2.55 -2.55 -2.55 -2.55 -2.55 -2.55 
205 Presentation of Financial Statements     -2.55 -0.17 
210 Balance Sheet   -2.55 -2.55 -2.55 -2.55 
220 
Income Statement—Reporting Comprehensive 
Income -0.54 -0.54 -0.54 -0.54 -0.54 -0.54 
225 Income Statement -0.54 -0.54 -0.54 -0.54 -0.54 -0.54 
230 Statement of Cash Flows -2.55 -2.55 -2.55 -2.55 -2.55 -0.17 
235 Notes to Financial Statements -2.55 -2.55 -2.55 -2.55 -2.55 -2.55 
250 Accounting Changes and Error Corrections -2.55 -2.55 -2.55 -2.55 -2.55 -2.55 
255 Changing Prices -2.55 -2.55 -2.55 -2.55 -2.55 -2.55 
260 Earnings Per Share -0.54 -0.54 -0.54 -0.54 -0.54 -0.54 
270 Interim Reporting -2.55 -2.55 -2.55 -2.55 -2.55 -2.55 
272 Limited Liability Entities 1.68 1.68 1.68 1.68 1.68 1.68 
280 Segment Reporting 1.68 1.68 1.68 1.68 1.68 1.68 
310 Receivables  -2.55 -2.55 -2.55 -2.55 -2.55 
320 Investments - Debt and Equity Securities 1.68 1.68 1.68 1.68 1.68 1.68 
323 Investments - Equity Method and Joint Ventures 5.59 5.59 5.59 5.59 5.59 7.97 
330 Inventory -2.55 -2.55 -2.55 -2.55 -2.55 -2.55 
350 Intangibles - Goodwill and Other 5.75 5.75 5.75 5.75 5.75 5.75 
360 Property, Plant, and Equipment 1.84 1.84 1.84 1.84 1.84 1.84 
405 Liabilities 1.68 1.68 1.68 1.68 1.68 1.68 
410 Asset Retirement and Environmental Obligations -0.54 -0.54 -0.54 -0.54 -0.54 -0.54 
420 Exit or Disposal Cost Obligations -2.55 -2.55 -2.55 -2.55 -2.55 -2.55 
440 Commitments -0.33 -0.33 -0.33 -0.33 -0.33 -0.33 
450 Contingencies -0.54 -0.54 -0.54 -0.54 -0.54 -0.54 
470 Debt 1.68 1.68 1.68 1.68 1.68 4.06 
480 Distinguishing Liabilities from Equity -0.54 -0.54 -0.54 -0.54 -0.54 -0.54 
505 Equity -0.33 -0.33 -0.33 -0.33 -0.33 -0.33 
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TABLE 3 (Continued) 
 
ASC # ASC Topics 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
605 Revenue Recognition 1.68 1.68 1.68 1.68 1.68 1.68 
715 Compensation - Retirement Benefits 4.06 4.06 4.06 4.06 4.06 4.06 
718 Compensation - Stock Compensation 1.84 1.84 1.84 1.84 1.84 1.84 
720 Other Expenses  -2.55 -2.55 -2.55 -2.55 -2.55 
730 Research and Development -0.54 -0.54 -0.54 -0.54 -0.54 -0.54 
740 Income Taxes 4.06 4.06 4.06 4.06 4.06 4.06 
805 Business Combinations 1.84 1.84 1.84 1.84 1.84 1.84 
810 Consolidation 4.06 4.06 4.06 4.06 4.06 4.06 
815 Derivatives and Hedging 5.75 5.75 1.84 1.84 1.84 3.37 
820 Fair Value Measurements 1.84 1.84 1.84 1.84 1.84 1.84 
825 Financial Instruments -0.54 -0.54 -0.54 -0.54 -0.54 -0.54 
830 Foreign Currency Matters -0.33 -0.33 -0.33 -0.33 -0.33 -0.33 
835 Interest -2.55 -2.55 -2.55 -2.55 -2.55 -0.17 
840 Leases 7.97 7.97 7.97 7.97 7.97 7.97 
845 Nonmonetary Transactions -0.54 -0.54 -0.54 -0.54 -0.54 -0.54 
850 Related Party Disclosures -0.33 -0.33 -0.33 -0.33 -0.33 -0.33 
852 Reorganizations -2.55 -2.55 -2.55 -2.55 -2.55 -2.55 
855 Subsequent Events -0.54 -0.54 -0.54 -0.54 -0.54 -0.54 
860 Transfers and Servicing -0.17 -0.17 -0.17 -0.17 -0.17 -0.17 
912 Contractors - Federal Government -2.55 -2.55 -2.55 -2.55 -2.55 -2.55 
915 Development Stage Entities -2.55 -2.55 -2.55 -2.55 -2.55 -2.55 
920 Entertainment - Broadcasters -2.55 -2.55 -2.55 -2.55 -2.55 -2.55 
922 Entertainment - Cable Television -2.55 -2.55 -2.55 -2.55 -2.55 -2.55 
924 Entertainment - Casinos  -2.55 -2.55 -2.55 -2.55 -2.55 
926 Entertainment - Films    -2.55 -2.55 -2.55 
928 Entertainment - Music -2.55 -2.55 -2.55 -2.55 -2.55 -2.55 
932 Extractive Activities - Oil and Gas 1.68 1.68 1.68 1.68 1.68 1.68 
944 Financial Services - Insurance -0.54 -0.54 -0.54 -0.54 -0.54 -0.54 
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TABLE 3 (Continued) 
 
ASC # ASC Topics 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
946 Financial Services - Investment Companies      1.68 
948 Financial Services - Mortgage Banking -0.54 -0.54 -0.54 -0.54 -0.54 -0.54 
950 Financial Services - Title Plant -2.55 -2.55 -2.55 -2.55 -2.55 -2.55 
952 Franchisors -2.55 -2.55 -2.55 -2.55 -2.55 -2.55 
954 Health Care Entities 4.06 4.06 4.06 4.06 4.06 4.06 
958 Not-for-Profit Entities -0.54 -0.54 -0.54 -0.54 -0.54 -0.54 
960 Plan Accounting - Defined Benefit Pension Plans -2.55 -2.55 -2.55 -2.55 -2.55 -2.55 
962 
Plan Accounting - Defined Contribution Pension 
Plans -2.55 -2.55 -2.55 -2.55 -2.55 -2.55 
970 Real Estate - General -0.54 -0.54 -0.54 -0.54 -0.54 -0.54 
976 Real Estate - Retail Land 5.96 5.96 5.96 5.96 5.96 5.96 
980 Regulated Operations -0.54 -0.54 -0.54 -0.54 -0.54 -0.54 
985 Software 1.84 1.84 1.84 1.84 1.84 1.84 
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FIGURE 2 
Changes of RBC2 in ASC Topics 
 
 
 
  
 
Figure 2 plots the changes of RBC2 scores in ASC Topics between 2009-2014. 
  
46  
TABLE 4 
Descriptive Statistics of All Firms 
 
Panel A: Univariate descriptive statistics for variables of interest 
Variable N Mean S.D. Min 0.25 Median 0.75 Max 
LnAF 1,410 15.39 0.93 13.23 14.74 15.33 16.00 18.31 
Restatement 1,410 0.08 0.27 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
PSCORE 1,410 -48.35 31.01 -319.35 -58.96 -45.38 -30.97 -0.12 
Big_4 1,410 0.99 0.09 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
LNTA 1,410 9.44 1.21 5.87 8.56 9.40 10.30 13.57 
LEV 1,410 1.11 3.36 0.00 0.26 0.56 1.02 38.63 
LOSS 1,410 0.06 0.24 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
ROA 1,410 0.07 0.06 -0.16 0.04 0.07 0.10 0.33 
GEOSEG 1,410 4.17 3.81 0.00 2.00 3.00 6.00 36.00 
BUSSEG 1,410 3.17 3.02 0.00 1.00 3.00 5.00 25.00 
 
 
Panel B: Correlation Matrix 
 
LnAF Restate PSCORE Big_4 LNTA LEV LOSS ROA GEOSEG BUSSEG 
LnAF  -0.041 -0.400 0.066 0.756 0.175 -0.020 -0.130 0.248 0.258 
Restatement -0.050  -0.007 0.028 -0.031 0.016 -0.043 0.024 -0.018 -0.031 
PSCORE -0.344 -0.024  -0.016 -0.420 -0.232 -0.042 0.267 -0.066 -0.138 
Big_4 0.086 0.028 -0.023  0.066 0.028 -0.009 0.021 0.073 0.037 
LNTA 0.774 -0.036 -0.393 0.058  0.308 0.001 -0.303 -0.070 0.142 
LEV 0.034 -0.033 -0.035 0.018 0.072  0.057 -0.388 -0.276 0.049 
LOSS -0.029 -0.043 -0.016 -0.009 -0.012 0.146  -0.412 -0.010 -0.007 
ROA -0.096 0.014 0.205 0.022 -0.220 -0.098 -0.504  0.211 -0.135 
GEOSEG 0.263 -0.031 -0.017 0.059 0.046 -0.045 -0.011 0.134  0.034 
BUSSEG 0.285 -0.042 -0.140 0.051 0.171 -0.002 -0.023 -0.121 0.045  
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Panel C: PSCORE descriptive statistics in 2-digit SIC industries 
SIC  Industry description 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 Overall 
10 Metal, Mining -39.98 -53.31 -63.60 -66.93 -90.37 -0.5073 -52.45 
13 Oil & Gas Extraction -43.00 -47.41 -53.21 -55.02 -54.93 -53.116 -51.11 
14 Nonmetallic Minerals, Except Fuels -40.93 -51.27 -55.43 -69.84 -58.41 -59.603 -55.91 
15 General Building Contractors -30.06 -35.10 -49.94 -41.17 -40.45 -38.649 -39.23 
16 Heavy Construction, Except Building -22.91 -34.16 -49.95 -57.53 -59.09 -45.813 -44.91 
20 Food & Kindred Products -29.53 -41.09 -56.07 -58.27 -66.26 -58.22 -51.57 
21 Tobacco Products -34.64 -58.38 -53.73 -51.92 -47.53 -40.041 -47.70 
22 Textile Mill Products -18.89 -14.10 -36.11 -38.57 -44.27 -45.68 -32.94 
23 Apparel & Other Textile Products -15.11 -8.77 -25.76 -42.96 -54.31 -48.084 -32.50 
25 Furniture & Fixtures -15.54 -20.54 -58.56 -61.55 -61.02 -66.496 -47.28 
26 Paper & Allied Products -39.68 -56.79 -53.02 -56.10 -52.38 -53.654 -51.94 
28 Chemical & Allied Products -28.24 -38.07 -52.68 -56.75 -57.54 -53.689 -47.83 
29 Petroleum & Coal Products -34.94 -50.30 -56.13 -53.25 -57.89 -51.921 -50.74 
30 Rubber & Miscellaneous Plastics Products -13.75 -19.22 -49.53 -56.09 -67.66 -59.971 -44.37 
31 Leather & Leather Products -6.94 -24.62 -25.60 -32.05 -99.26 -30.755 -36.54 
34 Fabricated Metal Products -12.83 -25.78 -44.42 -46.20 -55.43 -43.757 -38.07 
35 Industrial Machinery & Equipment -35.01 -47.12 -56.92 -61.95 -67.21 -58.007 -54.37 
36 Electronic & Other Electric Equipment -28.97 -38.14 -52.41 -57.08 -52.03 -53.493 -47.02 
37 Transportation Equipment -43.52 -50.16 -60.93 -63.10 -58.97 -54.622 -55.22 
38 Instruments & Related Products -36.82 -42.00 -52.94 -53.86 -55.10 -52.175 -48.82 
40 Railroad Transportation -24.32 -28.72 -41.66 -42.30 -45.61 -35.776 -36.40 
42 Trucking & Warehousing -31.62 -62.34 -61.13 -53.29 -50.38 -52.481 -51.87 
44 Water Transportation -11.28 -13.77 -36.95 -36.02 -39.02 -38.278 -29.22 
45 Transportation by Air -17.98 -17.19 -44.07 -44.30 -58.22 -46.756 -38.09 
47 Transportation Services -13.92 -18.50 -20.29 -21.40 -22.48 -23.605 -20.03 
48 Communications -38.51 -41.59 -54.07 -51.05 -51.09 -43.472 -46.63 
49 Electric, Gas, & Sanitary Services -59.64 -88.61 -99.05 -94.38 -86.30 -91.04 -86.50 
50 Wholesale Trade – Durable Goods -11.89 -24.78 -36.04 -38.03 -40.26 -40.106 -31.85 
51 Wholesale Trade – Nondurable Goods -18.02 -27.40 -50.21 -46.96 -74.31 -48.992 -44.32 
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Panel C (Continued): PSCORE descriptive statistics in 2-digit SIC industries 
SIC  Industry description 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 Overall 
52 Building Materials & Gardening Supplies -16.25 -17.65 -30.15 -28.67 -27.52 -25.095 -24.22 
53 General Merchandise Stores -14.35 -16.27 -37.10 -32.26 -34.55 -29.108 -27.27 
54 Food Stores -10.20 -15.86 -47.41 -40.45 -39.57 -38.035 -31.92 
55 Automative Dealers & Service Stations -9.48 -18.18 -29.82 -34.07 -34.82 -29.569 -25.99 
56 Apparel & Accessory Stores -13.87 -14.59 -40.30 -40.62 -41.53 -37.835 -31.46 
57 Furniture & Homefurnishings Stores -22.89 -28.54 -81.82 -64.85 -63.57 -53.373 -52.51 
58 Eating & Drinking Places -27.88 -34.89 -46.88 -51.16 -59.99 -46.044 -44.47 
59 Miscellaneous Retail -19.07 -19.63 -26.87 -36.00 -38.08 -37.553 -29.53 
67 Holding & Other Investment Offices -36.33 -49.02 -58.40 -51.39 -51.35 -0.6227 -41.18 
72 Personal Services -17.18 -26.86 -50.50 -60.31 -53.67 -42.143 -41.78 
73 Business Services -28.77 -30.15 -51.94 -54.49 -57.69 -52.636 -45.95 
78 Motion Pictures -14.23 -24.15 -24.64 -27.53 -25.49 -22.065 -23.02 
80 Health Services -37.99 -28.00 -52.96 -52.17 -55.02 -60.9 -47.84 
87 Engineering & Management Services -8.96 -15.57 -37.36 -37.10 -53.27 -37.839 -31.69 
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FIGURE 3 
Changes of Mean PSCORE  
 
  
 
Figure 3 presents the changes of average PSCORE from 2009 to 2014. 
 
 
 
50  
FIGURE 4A 
Mean PSCORE by Year in Big 4  
 
  
Figure 4A shows average PSCORE in Big 4 audit firms between 2009-2014. 
 
 
FIGURE 4B 
Big 4 Audit Fees by Year 
 
 
 Figure 4B shows audit fees of Big 4 audit firms by year.  
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TABLE 5 
OLS Regression Results -  Audit Fees 
 
LnAFit = β0+ β1PSCOREit + β2BIG_4it + β3LNTAit 
+β4LEVit + β5LOSSit + β6ROAit + β7GEOSEGit 
+ β8BUSSEGit + Industry/Year FE + εit  
 
 
 
  
Variable  Coeff. Beta t-statistic 
PSCORE - 0.001 -0.031 - 1.98 ** 
Big_4 0.037 0.004 0.28  
LNTA 0.640 0.832 52.48 *** 
LEV - 0.005 -0.017 - 1.34  
LOSS 0.065 0.017 1.10  
ROA 0.407 0.026 1.56  
GEOSEG 0.026 0.106 7.32 *** 
BUSSEG 0.021 0.068 5.00 *** 
Intercept 9.066  36.02 *** 
     
Year FE Included    
Industry FE Included    
   
N 1,410    
   
R2 (%) 80.49%    
∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ Denote significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, 
respectively (two-tailed). 
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TABLE 6 
Logistic Regression Results -  Restatements 
 
Restatementit = β0+ β1PSCOREit +β2BIG_Nit + β3BIG_4it * 
PSCOREit + β4LNTAit +β5LEVit + 
β6LOSSit + β7ROAit + β8GEOSEGit 
+β9BUSSEGit + Industry/Year FE + εit 
     
 
  Variable  Coeff. Beta t-statistic 
PSCORE - 0.000 -0.033 - 1.34 
Big_4 0.115 0.037 1.35 
BIG4PSCORE - 0.000 -0.013 - 0.02 
LNTA - 0.008 -0.038 - 1.08 
LEV - 0.001 -0.007 - 0.26 
LOSS - 0.034 -0.030 - 0.90 
ROA 0.069 0.015 0.41 
GEOSEG - 0.001 -0.012 - 0.38 
BUSSEG - 0.003 -0.033 - 1.12 
Intercept - 0.023  0.16 
    
Year FE Included  
Industry FE Included  
   
N 1,410  
   
R2 (%) 9.36%  
∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ Denote significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, 
respectively (two-tailed). 
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TABLE 7 
Descriptive Statistics – Timely Loss Recognition 
 
Panel A: Mean Variables of Full Sample 
Variable N Mean S.D. Min 0.25 Median 0.75 Max 
X 1,322 0.05 0.05 -0.52 0.04 0.05 0.07 0.49 
D 1,322 0.16 0.37 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
Ret 1,322 0.28 0.40 -0.79 0.07 0.21 0.40 3.78 
PSCORE 1,322 -49.07 31.75 -319.35 -59.59 -45.90 -31.15 -0.12 
D*Ret 1,322 -0.02 0.07 -0.79 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
RPSCORE 1,322 -12.21 19.55 -237.56 -17.02 -8.32 -2.29 32.34 
DRPSCORE 1,322 0.94 3.36 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 32.34 
 
 
Panel B: Correlation Matrix 
 X D Ret PSCORE D*Ret RPSCORE DRPSCORE 
X  0.078 -0.171 -0.022 -0.081 0.144 0.078 
D 0.048  -0.642 -0.035 -0.995 0.642 0.995 
Ret -0.079 -0.451  0.186 0.645 -0.852 -0.644 
PSCORE -0.016 -0.002 0.136  0.035 0.234 -0.053 
D*Ret -0.007 -0.667 0.393 -0.006  -0.644 -0.999 
Ret*PSCORE 0.021 0.407 -0.796 0.251 -0.353  0.645 
D*Ret*PSCORE 0.013 0.634 -0.364 -0.094 -0.897 0.361  
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TABLE 8 
OLS Regression Results -  Timely Loss Recognition 
 
Eit = β0 + β1Dit + β2Retit + β3PSCOREit + β4Dit * Retit + 
β5Retit * PSCOREit + β6Dit * Retit * PSCOREit + εit  
   
 
 Variable  Coeff. Beta t-statistic 
D 0.007 0.054 1.33  
Ret - 0.033 -0.264 - 4.19 *** 
PSCORE 0.000 0.083 2.12 ** 
D*Ret 0.110 0.154 2.00 ** 
Ret*PSCORE - 0.001 -0.213 - 3.37 *** 
D*Ret*PSCORE 0.002 0.099 1.39  
Intercept 0.060  15.73 *** 
     
Year FE Included    
Industry FE Included    
  
N 1,322    
      
R2 (%) 1.69%    
∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ Denote significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, 
respectively (two-tailed). 
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Appendix A 
Variable Definitions 
 
Variable Definition 
 
Dependent Variables: 
 
LnAFit = nature logarithm of audit fees for company i in year t; 
 
Restatementsit = 1 if company i’s audited financial statements in year t 
are subsequently restated, and 0 otherwise; 
 
Eit = earnings for firm i in year t, deflated by opening stock 
price Pt-1; 
 
Other Variables: 
 
 
PSCOREit = product of relative importance score of firm i for 
standard s in year t and the standard s’ corresponding 
RBC1 score in year t; 
 
BIG_4it = 1 if company i is audited by a Big 4 firm in year t, and 
0 otherwise; 
 
LNTAit = natural logarithm of total assets for company i in year t; 
 
LEVit = total liability in year t divided by total assets, 
winsorized at 1 and 99 percent; 
 
LOSSit = 1 if company i reports a loss in year t, and 0 otherwise; 
 
ROAit = income before extraordinary items in year t divided by 
total assets, winsorized at 1 and 99 percent; 
 
GEOSEGit = the number of geographic segments for firm i in year t; 
 
BUSSEGit = the number of business segments for firm i in year t; 
 
Dit = 1 if firm i reports a loss (Retit <0) in year t, and 0 
otherwise; 
 
Retit = return on firm i from 9 months before the fiscal year-
end t to three months after the fiscal year-end t. 
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Appendix B 
Indicators of Rules-based Characteristics  
 
Bright-line thresholds 
 
 A bright-line is defined as a numeric threshold that delineates appropriate 
accounting treatments. The keywords used to identify bright-lines are: criteri*, condition*, 
provision*, require*, and percent*.19 I read the surrounding paragraph to determine the 
presences of these numeric thresholds. The sum of total numeric bright-line thresholds for 
each standard is counted. 
 
Scope and Legacy Exceptions  
 
 Scope and legacy exceptions lead to inconsistent accounting treatment for similar 
transactions. The keywords used to identify scope and legacy exceptions are: not subject, 
not consider*, exclusion*, exempt*, scope, and does not apply. I read the surrounding 
paragraph to determine the presences of these exceptions. The sum of total numeric bright-
line thresholds for each standard is counted. 
 
 
Large-volumes of Implementation Guidance 
 
 Both principles- and rules-based standards contain some level of implementation 
guidance. To identify large volumes of interpretive guidance as rules-based characteristics, 
the number of “interpretive pronouncements” from each accounting standard is counted. 
Then, all standards are ranked by the number of “interpretive pronouncements”. Only the 
standards in the top decile are classified as large volumes of implementation guidance. 
 
High-level of Details 
 
First, the level of detail in each U.S. standard is identified by a word count. I then rank all 
standards by their total number of words.  Only the ones in the top decile are classified as 
high-level of detail standards. Following Mergenthaler (2011), background and basis for 
conclusions sections in the word count are excluded. 
  
                                                          
19 The keywords with * represent root words; all stemming words are also captured by textual analysis. For 
example, the search for keyword “criteri*” will also return stemming words such as “criteria” and 
“criterion”. 
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Appendix C 
Keyword Extraction by ASC Topic 
 
ASC Standard Keyword 1 Keyword 2 Keyword 3 Keyword 4 
105 FAS168 accounting standards 
codification 
gaap hierarchy nongovernmental entities  authoritative 
205 ASC_205_30 compara* financial 
statement* 
presentation and 
disclosure  
discontinued operation liquidation basis of 
accounting  
210 ASC_210_20 classification of current 
assets (liabilities) 
offset* repurchase agreement* statement of financial 
position 
220 FAS130 comprehensive income 
 
225 APB9 discontinued operations extraordinary items disposal /5/ segment unusual /5/ infrequent∗ 
230 FAS95 operating (investing) 
(financing) activities 
cash receipts and 
payments  
(in)direct method  
235 APB22 disclosure of accounting 
policies  
250 FAS154 change in accounting 
principle 
change in accounting 
estimate 
change in reporting entity error /5/ previously issued 
financial statement 
255 FAS89 Changing Prices five-year summary  translate-restate  restate-translate  
260 FAS128 basic (dilutive) earnings 
per share (EPS) 
computations /5/ 
earnings per share 
(EPS) 
270 APB28 (summarized) interim 
financial  
less than a full year  interim period* 
272 ASC_272_10 limited liability entit*/ 
compan* 
limited personal liability  
275 ASC_275_10 inherent  estimat* assumption* assess* /5/ risk* and 
uncertaint* 
280 FAS131 operating segments  aggregation criteria components  allocate /5/ resources 
310 ASC_310_10 trouble∗ debt restruc∗ debt /5/ restruc∗ debt restruct /5/ settle∗ debt /5/ modifi∗ 
320 FAS115 available-for-sale /5/ 
securit∗ 
trading /5/ securit Held-to-maturity /5/ 
securit∗ 
other than temporary 
impairment /10/ investment 
323 APB18 equity method significant influence share of earnings share of loss(es) 
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Appendix C (Continued) 
 
ASC Standard Keyword 1 Keyword 2 Keyword 3 Keyword 4 
330 ARB43_4 lower of cost or market /1/ 
impairment 
inventory /1/ 
impairment 
inventory pricing firm purchase 
commitment 
360 FAS144 property, plant, and 
equipment 
accumulated 
depreciation 
impair∗ (dispos∗) /5/ long-
lived 
real estate /5/ sale* 
405 ASC_405_30 insurance-related  assessments guaranty-fund noninsurance entity  
410 FAS143 asset∗ retirement obligation 
 
420 FAS146 restruct∗ (exp∗| charg∗| 
activit∗| reserv∗) 
exit or disposal activit∗ exit /5/ disposal activity /5/ 
termination benefits 
440 FAS47 purchase commitment purchase obligation long-term commitment long-term obligation 
450 FAS5 conting∗ liab∗ conting∗ gain conting∗ /5/ loss conting∗ /5/ 
reasonably possible 
470 EITF09_1 warrant /5/ debt convertible /5/ debt stock purchase warrant∗ conversion option /5/ 
debt 
480 FAS150 instruments with 
characteristics of both 
liabilities and equity 
freestanding financial 
instrument 
  
505 ASC_505_20 stock dividends stock split∗ split-ups 
 
605 SAB101 revenue /10/ multiple 
deliverables 
multiple deliverable 
arrangement∗ 
direct cost /10/ multiple 
deliverable 
unit /5/ value /5/ stand-
alone basis 
606 ASC_606_10 contracts with customers performance obligation Transaction Price 
710 ASC_710_10 compensation deferred /5/ 
compensation 
compensated absence* Rabbi Trust* 
715 FAS87 pension projected benefit 
obligation 
accumulated benefit 
obligation 
funding of plan assets 
718 FAS123r (stock|share)-based 
compensation 
option(s) /5/ 
(grant∗|issue∗|award∗) 
restricted stock /5/ 
(grant∗|issue∗|award∗) 
grant date 
720 ASC_720_50 pharmaceutical 
manufactur* 
health insur* annual fee*  Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act 
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Appendix C (Continued) 
 
ASC Standard Keyword 1 Keyword 2 Keyword 3 Keyword 4 
730 FAS2 research and develop∗ research /5/ cost∗ fund∗ /5/ research and 
development 
research and 
development /5/ 
obligation∗ 
805 FAS141r business combination merge∗ /5/ purchase acqui∗ /5/ purchase merge∗ /5/ contingent 
consideration 
810 ARB51+FAS167 consolidat∗ /5/ financial 
statement 
intercompany /5/ 
eliminat ∗ 
controlling financial 
interest 
minority interest 
815 FAS133 derivativ∗ hedg ∗ underlying /5/ notional 
amount∗ 
put /2/ option 
820 ASC_820_10 fair value /5/ measur* market participa* valuation technique observable input* 
825 FAS107 disclos∗ /5/ financial∗ 
instrument∗ /5/ fair value 
830 FAS52 reporting currency foreign currency functional currency translation adjustment 
835 FAS34 interest /3/ capitaliz∗ self-constructed asset /5/ 
debt 
self-constructed asset /5/ 
interest 
840 FAS13 Lease bargain purchase option bargain renewal option transfer∗ ownership /5/ 
lesee 
845 APB29 non [-] monetary 
transaction 
non [-] monetary 
exchange 
non [-] reciprocal transfer 
850 FAS57 related part∗ 
  
852 ARB43_7a quasi-reorganization corporate readjustment 
853 ASC_853_10 infrastructure  service concession 
arrangement* 
855 FAS165 subsequent event* after /5/ balance sheet 
date  
potential recognition  
860 FAS166 transfer∗ /5/ financ∗ asset∗ servic∗ /5/ financ∗ 
asset∗ 
extinguish∗ /2/ liabilit∗ extinguish∗ /2/ debt 
912 ARB43_11c fixed fee /5/ war contract∗ 
/5/ terminat∗ 
war /5/ contract /5/ 
terminat∗ 
defense /5/ contract /5/ 
terminat∗ 
war and defense 
contract /5/ terminat∗ 
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                                      Appendix C (Continued) 
 
ASC Standard Keyword 1 Keyword 2 Keyword 3 Keyword 4 
915 FAS7 develop∗ stage /10/ 
enterpris∗ 
develop∗ stage /10/ 
corp∗ 
develop∗ stage /10/ 
company 
planned principal 
operations /5/ 
commenced 
922 FAS51 cable television cable /5/ hookup 
 
924 ASC_924_605 casino* promotional allowance* complimentar* gaming 
926 ASC_926_20 film produc* film distribut* film cost* Ultimate revenue  
928 FAS50 record∗ industry music industry music /5/ advance royalty record /5/ advance 
royalty 
932 FAS19 exploration mineral rights proved reserves unproved reserves 
944 FAS60 insurance contract insurance /3/ short-
duration /2/ contract∗ 
insurance /3/ long-duration 
/2/ contract∗ 
insurance /2/ claim∗ 
cost 
946 ASC_946_10 investment compan* substantive activit* 
 
948 FAS65 mortgage loans mortgage-backed 
securities 
loan fees commitment fees 
950 FAS61 title plant 
   
952 FAS45 franchise fee franchise /5/ sales franchise /5/ revenue 
954 FAS106 health care entit* not-for-profit investor-owned health care industr* 
958 FAS117 not-for-profit  nonprofit activit* noncontrolling 
960 FAS35 defined benefit /5/ pension defined benefit /5/ plan 
962 FAS35 defined contribution /5/ 
pension 
defined contribution /5/ 
plan 
970 FAS67 capitaliz∗ /5/ real estate /5/ 
acquisition 
capitaliz∗ /5/ real estate 
/5/ develop∗ 
capitaliz∗ /5/ real estate /5/ 
construction 
capitaliz∗ /5/ real 
estate /5/ sale 
976 FAS66 sale∗ /5/ real estate retail land sale∗ 
 
980 FAS71 cost-based rates /3/ 
regulat∗ 
accounting for the 
effects of certain types 
of regulation 
regulat∗ asset∗ (liabilit∗) regulated enterprise 
985 SOP97_2 multiple element /5/ 
software 
objective evidence /2/ 
element∗/5/ fair value 
vendor specific objective 
evidence 
software /10/ revenue 
recognition 
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